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Insourcing Enjoyment  




For Robert Pfaller, who first proposed the concept in 1996, interpassvity is 
most straightforwardly ‘the preference of particular subjects for 
delegating their enjoyment rather than having it themselves’.1 
Interpassivity describes the pleasure yielded by a subject when his or her 
acts of pleasure are experienced via the body of another. Simple 
examples include telling your friends to ‘have a drink for you,’ egging 
them on to create an online dating profile or asking your kids to send you 
a postcard. Something like the common parlance for the idea is the 
concept of ‘living vicariously.’ For Pfaller, ‘rather than delegating their 
responsibilities to representative agents, interpassive people delegate 
precisely the things that they enjoy doing – those things that they do for 
pleasure, out of passion or conviction’.2 To put this into the language of 
contemporary capitalism, we can call interpassivity outsourced – rather 
than delegated - enjoyment.  
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Both the general idea of vicarious living and Pfaller’s definition of 
interpassivity seem to imply that interpassive acts or behaviours are not 
the dominant form of enjoyment found in contemporary (capitalist) social 
life but are rather an odd form of enjoyment which makes its presence 
felt on the edges of pleasure, as it were, perhaps present in all of us 
(though more common in some than in others) but tending to arise 
occasionally as moments of a strange circumvention or contradiction of 
the normal rules of enjoyment. While enjoyment is normally conceived of 
as our own and we usually want our pleasures for ourselves, interpassive 
moments seem to operate against this grain of logical capitalist 
enjoyment, or so it seems at first.  
 
 This short paper suggests that, contrary to such conceptions, there 
is a particularly prominent level of interpassivity visible in the emergent 
relationship between humans and machines which is coming to 
characterise the kind of ‘platform capitalism’ we can expect to see 
cemented over the next several decades. It asks – in opposition to the 
implications of the above conceptions - whether interpassivity is not in 
fact the dominant mode of enjoyment in contemporary online social life, 
just as outsourced labour is the dominant mode in the realm of work. 
Pfaller speculated that interpassivity might be connected to ‘consumer 
capitalism’ but I argue – albeit in a highly provisional way - for its specific 
role in (and ability to comment on) what Nick Srnicek and others have 
called ‘platform capitalism;’ a world of work and leisure dominated by an 
increasingly small number of major corporate powerhouses that are 
almost indistinguishable from state apparatuses and who hold extreme 
levels of technological and social power.3 Yet, I suggest not that all 
enjoyment is interpassive in precisely the sense described by Pfaller but 
that interpassivity has or is being transformed in this climate of platform 
capitalism. 
 
 The provisional proposal here is that what Mladen Dolar has called 
‘enjoying machines,’ technology which enjoys on our behalf, are now one 
of the most common kinds of machine that humans interact with.4 
Alongside this, I suggest the emergence of another interpassive form of 
enjoyment present in the relationship between humans and their 




technology: not only machines who enjoy on the behalf of people but 
people who enjoy on the behalf of machines. On this point we can 
playfully suggest that even if the machine cannot ‘enjoy’, as humanist 
technophobes often remind us, it can nevertheless put us to enjoy on its 
behalf.  
 
 Finally, the article moves to discuss a third relationship in the 
technological-libidinal economy of interpassivity – perhaps the most 
important of all – which involves a situation where the machine operates 
not in the place of a person (as Marx defined technology) but as a 
mediator between humans, what McLuhan might call the medium or 
what we might now call the platform. In such cases a user outsources 
their enjoyment to another human through the platform, or alternatively is 
insourced by other humans via the platform to enjoy on the behalf of 
those other users. We could equally playfully put this last form of 
interpassive enjoyment into the language of Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
the outsourcing work platform where ‘requesters’ list jobs for ‘turkers’ to 
complete for a tiny reward way below a living wage. Many forms of 
social media play this role for enjoyment – rather than for work – and the 
suggestion here is that this revolution in the outsourcing and insourcing 
(turking and requesting) of enjoyment follows almost impossibly close on 
the tail of those new forms of economy and workforce organization. It is 
not, therefore, – as Pfaller may sometimes imply – that we often 
outsource work but occasionally outsource enjoyment - but that we must 
do, tend to do or necessarily do both at once. These increasingly 
prevalent types of interpassive pleasure then, are symptoms of 
developments in platform capitalism, but they are symptoms which are 
sometimes run ahead and loop back, showing us a frightful glimpse into 
the implications of platform capitalism as it develops.  
 
 These three forms of interpassive enjoyment are prominent in our 
online lives and essentially that almost all enjoyment in social life now 
involves at least one of these three forms of interpassive pleasure. It 
might be necessary to make a distinction between these forms of 
interpassivity, as Pfaller’s original concept considered the preference of 
particular subjects for delegating their enjoyment rather than having it 




themselves but not the preference for particular subjects to have their 
enjoyment delegated by others and did not attend to the machine who 
connects the user to its enjoyer or the enjoyer to its host. In today’s world 
of enjoyment, it might be less a case of designating one form of 
enjoyment as interpassive and another as not being so, and much more 
a case of considering which form of interpassivity our moments of 
pleasure constitute and whom they serve. 
 
Putting the Machines to Enjoy 
 
Some of the early examples of interpassive acts given by Pfaller are 
technological ones. Interpassive behaviours are ritualistic, like the 
obsessional neuroses identified in patients by Freud such as his 
analysand under a compulsion to rinse round her wash-basin several 
times after washing and peculiar machinic examples from the last 
several decades include those TV viewers who obsessionally 
programmed their Sky boxes to record hundreds of TV shows with little 
or no intention of watching those shows back, as if the box did the 
watching for them, and those academics who developed a relentless 
propensity for getting their university’s photocopier to do their reading for 
them.5  
 
 Adding to these examples, themselves decades old now, we can 
think of some comparable appearances of interpassive robots which 
make use of the latest technology. One obvious robot who relied on 
interpassive pleasure to sustain its existence was HITCHBot, the 2015 
robot who hitch-hiked around the US until it was attacked, its Baby 
Boomer followers living out their nostalgic hitch-hiking dreams of 
freedom and the open road vicariously by following its progress online. 
Other more prominent examples of using robots interpassively might be 
obsessive digital playlist curation on Spotify, and another prime example 
of an interpassive person would be Elon Musk, whose joy at sending his 
Tesla vehicle to space was palpable. Discussing the humourous 
example of city dwellers who drive SUV four-wheel drive cars precisely to 
get the off-road experience without having to leave the city limits, Pfaller 
argues that ‘cultural capitalist goods are dispatchers of vicarious life; they 




are interpassive media’.6 In this formulation the consumer is able to put 
the car to enjoy on its behalf, so that the individual pays to have 
experienced the pleasure of off-road driving but no longer needs to 
experience the pleasure for themselves. The above examples all involve 
this kind of relationship in which financial expenditure can produce 
outsourced interpassive enjoyment. As such the logic of interpassivity 
would be prominent in the world of commodities, a form of capitalism 
that is still with us but has a long history, which allows the commodity to 
produce a particular form of pleasure for those consumers able to 
expend capital on it. In such cases the commodity, whether 
technological of now, is employed as a strange kind of interpassive 
agent for the buyer. 
 
 Yet, the topic here is not the link between consumer capitalism 
and interpassivity but a more recent connection between platform 
capitalism and the dominance of interpassivity as a form of enjoyment 
experienced online today. It seems obvious to say that social media 
might be the ultimate realization of interpassive behaviour for the way it 
creates a norm in which the act of the subject and their enjoyment of the 
act is tied up with real and imaginary observers of the acts in question. 
Only some aspects of social media use would fit this original definition of 
interpassivity, however. One such example would be the sharing of 
articles without reading them. This phenomena may be partly about 
identification (with the shared article/image/post), and it may also show 
a kind of archiving drive (though this has moved to the ‘save’ feature of 
Facebook) but – in addition to these things - it also involves an 
interpassive pleasure in which the machine does the ‘reading’ for the 
user. The avatar could be seen as a representative agent through whom 
we vicariously live, a form of machine employed to enjoy – and to work - 
on our behalf. On the one hand the avatar liberates the user from the 
need to participate in certain ‘enjoyments’ directly (keeping in touch with 
friends and family, liking the posts of others, etc etc), and it also does the 
work of careerism and contact base-building, leaving us free to do the 
real ‘work’ which feel compelled to do, or allowing us to enjoy only the 
things we ‘really’ want to enjoy. In such cases, it is nearly impossible to 




maintain a distinction between work and enjoyment, which is one of the 
most crucial features of platform capitalism.  
 
 Mladen Dolar links the emergence of enjoying machines with the 
idea of la claque, those organized and importantly paid applauders put to 
work in theatre (indeed perhaps since the origins of theatre) before the 
technology for ‘canned laughter’ - another prominent example of 
interpassivity - developed. Discussing old traditions of paying for 
applause, Dolar writes: 
 
This new machine, which infallibly produced nothing less than 
glory, is an extension of a very old phenomenon, which I suspect 
might be as old as the invention of theater itself, and which in 
French has an unmatchably economical and evocative name, la 
claque. It designates organized applause, the group of “hired 
hands” in the audience who applaud by prearrangement, most 
often for financial reward.7 
 
 It’s not difficult to see that certain forms of social media, perhaps 
Facebook and Twitter in particular, may function in the guise of la claque 
today. It is not simply that we pay the machine (in the form of free 
content generation) to applaud us, but that the machine is put to work for 
us as a body who enjoys so that we are not required to do so directly. 
When we react to a post with the laughing or shocked emoticon, for 
example, we are passing the obligation to react – and its associated 
pleasures – to the technology itself: we enjoy it interpassively, delegating 
pleasure to the machine so that we are not ourselves required to act. It’s 
of course not that the ‘react’ emoticon is representative of the subject’s 
real-life reaction (most people write ‘lol’ instead of laughing and not after 
laughing), so that we are clearly in the realm of interpassive pleasure 
with almost every online social engagement. If there is any truth in this 
suggestion, it at the very least shows the prevalence of interpassivity 
today. It also, on the basis of the brief discussion here, suggests that the 
distinction between delegating work and delegating enjoyment may be 
finer than ever. 
 




Enjoying for the Machines 
 
It is tempting to consider the enjoyment generated in videogames in 
terms of Pfaller’s notion of interpassivity. In a certain sense, we could say 
that videogames involve a version of vicarious living. If so, the model of 
the four-by-four car which never leaves the inner city might be a clue to 
the nature of interpassive forms of gaming, which offer the user a 
pleasure yield from an experience (the point is especially clear in the 
case of simulator games: flying, fishing, farming, and so on) through the 
body of the machine, removing the need for the gamer to physically go 
fishing to experience the pleasure in question. In videogames in general, 
we could say that avatars, characters, and other digital agents 
experience affects (or appear to) on the user’s behalf and in response to 
their commands, so that the user enjoys vicariously through the body of 
the agent.  
 
One could identify a difference in that the gamer is somehow 
present – albeit in a displaced way - at the moment of gaming, rather 
than doing something else, whereas the vicarious logic of ‘having a drink 
on me’ relies on not having time, energy or space to be present for the 
act. The answer to this lies Pfaller’s earlier work On the Pleasure Principle 
in Culture, in which he discusses processes of dromena which appear to 
occupy the subject but in fact allow them to be somewhere else entirely 
on a psychological level. In acts of dromena, such as chanting, repeating 
lines or humming, ‘the repetition of symbols can also cause one to have 
as little as possible to do with these symbols and the situation they 
describe.’8 Slavoj Žižek has written similarly that the appeal of dromena is 
that ‘in my psychological interior I can think about whatever I want.’9 
Gaming, seen as an experience of dromena, is an interpassive act where 
the digital agent goes through a process so the subject does not need to 
on a psychological level. In this way, videogames could be an example 
of a human putting a machine to enjoy in the way discussed above. 
 
 On the contrary, however, the interpassivity in gaming seems in 
general to turn in the opposite direction. It is not so much that the active 
user puts the digital objects in the machine to work or enjoy on their 




behalf, but that the game itself – as a machine - puts the users enjoyment 
to work on its own terms. This would reverse Ian Bogost’s idea that 
‘games are devices we operate’ and suggest instead that we are 
operated by games.10 The point may need some psychoanalytic 
explanation. 
 
 There is a long history of considering videogames in relation to (or 
as a way to realize) existing desires, a point which may go as far as 
Pfaller himself, who countered the traditional idea that games make us 
violent by arguing that they are more likely to function as a kind of safety-
valve outlet for frustrations than increase the amount of school shootings 
and violent attacks among the gaming youth.11 Videogames, however, 
have a much more dialectical relationship with desire than is often 
thought, whereby they not only respond to existing desires but construct 
new ones and mutate older ones. Each game has a politics and an 
ideology which is experienced in a complicated way by the player. The 
gamer’s experience could be considered in terms of the distinction 
between drive and instinct in psychoanalytic terms. While instinct comes 
from within, or at least seems to, drives approach the body of the subject 
from outside, propelling them in certain directions. The distinction 
originates in Freud and is re-asserted by Lacan: 
 
Trieb gives you a kick in the arse, my friends – quite different from 
so-called instinct. That’s how psycho-analytic teaching is passed 
on.12 
 
 Videogames are in the realm of drive rather than instinct, a point 
that would render ideas of games as wish-fulfillment redundant. Games 
do not respond to already existing wishes, natural desires or impulses. 
Instead, they propel the subject in new political and ideological directions 
while asking them to experience and feel the ideology of the game as if it 
were their own desire to move in those directions. Games are best 
conceived of as drive masquerading as or experienced as instinct. 
 
The gamer, in this conception, is put to work for the logic of the 
machine, rather than putting the machine to work for its own pleasure. 




While the game may have human owners and creators, and is obviously 
the result of political and social conditions surrounds its production, 
dissemination and use, it exceeds or combines these to impose its own 
ideology on the gamer by offering the gamer the chance to experience 
the game’s own ideological positions, empathies and desires as if it were 
the gamers own pre-existing desire to do so.13 Videogames are machines 
which ask the user to enjoy on their terms, insourcing a human agent. 
While the machine may not experience interpassive pleasure, the user 
experiences a reverse form of interpassive enjoyment. 
 
 In this way, games offer something like the reverse of the social 
media ‘react’ feature discussed in the first section. Where Facebook 
‘reacting’ is interpassive in the traditional sense of putting a piece of 
technology to enjoy for you, gaming is the interpassive opposite insofar 
as each piece of technology puts the user to enjoy for it. Robots may not 
enjoy, but they can put us to enjoy on their behalf. While traditional 
conceptions of interpassivity are ‘outsourced’ enjoyment, we could 
describe these forms of enjoyment as ‘insourced’ enjoyment, insofar as 
the subject is essentially recruited by the technology to enjoy for it and 
according to its logic, rather than the other way around.  
 
The Platform is the Message 
 
I have so far attempted to split interpassivity as it seems to function in 
regard to new technology in platform capitalism into two categories, but 
there is a third and more important form of interpassivity which is even 
more prevalent that the two forms discussed above. This form involves 
the now normal situation in which the primary role of technology in the 
libidinal economy of humans is to operate as a medium through which 
humans re-double and organize their enjoyment by insourcing and 
outsourcing themselves and each other as agents through which to 
enjoy. Both the above examples of social networks and videogames 
contain strong trends of this final form of interpassivity as well as the 
forms discussed in each of the above sections. This kind of enjoyment, 
which involves an interpassive connection between two or more humans 
whose connection is circuited through a piece of technology could be 




given another categorical term. If typical interpassivity (embodied by 
social media ‘react’ features) is outsourced enjoyment and its reverse 
(embodied by gaming) is insourced enjoyment, this final form could be 
termed ’co-opted’ enjoyment.   
 
Some definition of the platform is needed to approach this type of 
enjoyment. Defining the concept of a platform in The Stack, Benjamin 
Bratton uses the etymology of the word to explore the implications of a 
technical platform in the age of modern machines: 
 
By at least 1803, platform takes on more explicitly political 
meaning, as in a “statement of party policies.” All three of these 
connotations (platform as a plan of action, as a stage for a plot, 
and as proposed rules of governance) are important for 
understanding The Stack as a platform and for platform 
sovereignty in general. One is set of instructions, one is a situated 
place where action is played out according to plan, and one is a 
framework for a political architecture. Already these connotations 
are slipping and sliding into one another.14 
 
 Social platforms – including both social media and multiplayer 
videogames - are a set of instructions, a stage on which interaction takes 
place, and politics itself. Bratton’s work, which argues that politics is a 
machinic system, reminds us that the platform might seem like nothing 
more than a stage on which politics can play out, but in fact is it much 
more than that: technology and machines have a politics of their own. Of 
Facebook itself as a platform, and specifically identifying the react feature 
discussed in this article, Bratton writes: 
 
Peers like what you say, they share your offerings, and, in time, 
they subscribe to you, the individual character in your own reality 
mini-show. The fabrication of the self becomes the primary project 
of this platform, at least for the User, but in time, this general model 
could take many different forms, as subjectivity and agency are 
dispersed into nonlocal networks and assignments.15 
 




 Interpassivity is important in the construction of the user’s ‘own 
reality mini-show’ since the process requires others (imaginary and real) 
to be insourced to enjoy each post, photo or video posted by the host of 
the mini-show, while each host is themselves outsourced to play the role 
of enjoying audience for others. The logic of the process is something 
like the following formula: I enjoy on behalf of another user, providing that 
yet other users enjoys on my behalf. Facebook then, creates a kind of 
infinite looping and re-doubling of interpassive connections between 
people, things and digital objects, a new libidinal exchange economy. 
The more interpassive a society becomes, the more dependent it 
becomes on the platform as the means through which the subject can 
connect to the other agents required to generate pleasure. The pleasure 
of uploading an avocado to Instagram cannot be achieved without 
access to the platform which makes it possible to be the agent though 
which others can live vicariously, while simultaneously allowing us to live 
vicariously through other agents. 
 
 Bratton’s quotation also points to the danger of the situation. While 
the ‘the primary project of the platform’ (in the case of Facebook) may be 
the fabrication of the self, this is only so from the perspective of the user. 
If the user sees the platform only as platform (as a stage for a plot) then it 
labours under the illusion that it does little more than ‘connect people’ (as 
platform owners frequently repeat) but if one is attentive to the function of 
the platform (as political governance) then the transformative potential of 
the platform becomes more visible. For the user, the platform may only 
be a means to realize the project of self fabrication, but the platform itself 
may lead into a rather different political future by dispersing and re-
organizing subjectivity and agency in new ways. As such, these 
theorizations of platform society are an update to MuLuhan’s famous 
maxim that ‘the medium is the message,’ pointing to the importance of 
form over content and of the technology over the subject’s use of it.16 One 
possible transformation in the subject of Facebook – a result of the 
politics of the technology itself rather than the user’s experience or the 
content on the platform - is its increasing dependence on co-opted 
interpassive pleasure. The enjoyment of Facebook then, which appeals 
to the user because it allows them to cultivate their mini-reality show 




identity (a user- and content-focused impression of the platform), is co-
opted by the platform and potentially put to use for other political ends 




The existence of interpassivity, at least in its early conceptions, showed a 
hiccup in the smooth function of capitalist logic, or a gap in what Mark 
Fisher has called ‘capitalist realism.’17 The delegation of enjoyment was 
important because it questioned the capitalist narrative about our 
relationship to the worker and (now) to the robot labour force. The 
capitalist subject had been delegating work tasks and responsibilities for 
centuries, with the dominant general line that the subject delegates such 
tasks in order to free up its own time for other pursuits: namely the 
pursuit of pleasure and enjoyment. Today, work is delegated to robots 
rather than to other people, though this may not be an exclusively new 
development since in Capital Marx defines a machine as ‘a mechanism 
that, after being set in motion, performs with its tools the same 
operations as the worker formerly did with similar tools’.18 On the other 
hand, the platform may be a type of machine which operates not as 
Marx described but in a new role not previously filled by a human agent. 
In the typical narrative, the privileged subject puts the other – whether 
machinic or human - to work, so that they themselves can enjoy. In this 
older situation, if interpassivity’s existence was acknowledged, the logic 
of this system broke down, or so the initial argument went. Now, we are 
looking at a rather different future where interpassivity has emerged 
without breaking the smooth logic capitalist realism. We might go further 
and say that interpassivity could be conceived of the form of enjoyment 
most harnessed by, celebrated by and conducive to a new form of 
platform capitalism which dominates economic and social life today.  
 
 Various theorists have approached the problem of working for free 
in the age of the platform in terms of what has been called 
‘heteromation,’ the process by which economic value is derived 
(primarily by corporations) from the user’s ‘pleasurable’ time spent on 
digital media. Enjoyment, now inseparable from work, is harvested by the 




platform for economic gain. Certain necessary redefinitions of work 
which have aimed to combat the trend have shown that while we are 
worried about automation and the lack of work in the platform capitalist 
future, there is a parallel problem that in fact we are all working much 
more rather than less than in previous in pre-Facebook years. Playing 
with the Wages for Housework movement, ‘Wages for Facebook’ curator 
Laurent Ptak writes: 
 
They say it’s friendship. We say it’s unwaged work. With every like, 
chat, tag or poke our subjectivity turns them a profit. They call it 
sharing. We call it stealing.19 
 
 The question of enjoyment becomes paramount in such 
conditions because the platform works by harvesting our pleasure to 
generate profit, making the apparent distinction between work and 
enjoyment a vital part of how this form of capitalism functions. 
Asking ‘what will we do in the post-work utopia?’, Smith and 
Pffanebecker counter some of Srnicek and Williams’ optimism about the 
post-work age of automation: 
 
The ideological, economic and political measures they present do 
not take account of the problem of desire. Our desires are never 
simply our own, and therefore work can never be driven simply by 
‘our own desires’.20 
 
  Interpassivity makes this point – vital for both libidinal and 
economic futures - visible to us. As the concept that calls the relation 
between work and enjoyment into question, interpassivity could be seen 
as the enemy of a platform capitalism that wants its subjects to turn 
profit by their very acts of enjoyment. This puts interpassivity on an odd 
boundary, since it can also be seen as the form of enjoyment most 
encouraged in the era of the platform, as has been argued above. 
Platform capitalism paradoxically asserts and erases the distinction 
between enjoyment and work, asserting the distinction it so that it can 
generate profit from enjoyment without accountability and dissolving it 
so that its subjects become its workers in the very moments they are 




most ‘free’ to enjoy. Interpassivity then, might be becoming more and 
more dominant as a form of enjoyment, but as such it becomes more 
and more important as a concept for those who progressively oppose 
or question such developments in platform capitalism. If interpassivity is 
now the logic of conformist enjoyment rather than a radical edge to 
enjoyment patterns, as a conceptual tool it is more vital than ever in 
making visible how we are organized via enjoyment in social life today. 
Interpassvity confronts the problem of desire in platform capitalism, one 
of the most pressing political issues of this transitional moment. 
 
 The final suggestion here is that the current shift of power (from 
individual users, traditional media, states and even older corporations) to 
the platform takes place not only on the level of work – as embodied by 
Amazon Turk – but also on the level of enjoyment – as embodied by the 
examples discussed in this article. It might seem rather obvious to say 
that Uber (platform in/outsourcing in the realm of work) could not exist 
without Instagram (platform in/outsourcing in the realm of enjoyment) 
but the point seems oddly obscured in most discourse on the subject. 
The insourcing, outsoucing and co-opting of enjoyment, I hope to have 
suggested in this brief and very much provisional article, is 
indistinguishable from the dangerous re-organization of work we are in 
the midst of today. It we want to tackle the problems of work in the age of 
the platform, we need to pay close attention to patterns of enjoyment. It 
might even be the case that such reformations in the libidinal economy 
provide clues as to the futures we can expect in political and financial 
economies. At the very least, they make visible the effects of the newest 
economic changes on the level of subjectivity. 
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